Human beings are much more than their physical bodies:
Many people today discount or deny what most people throughout human history have always thought: that people are more than material in nature, and there is a spiritual or soulish reality to who we are. Or to use philosophical terminology, in more recent times the previously held beliefs in substance dualism have been replaced with versions of physicalism and philosophical naturalism.
Thus something immaterial like the mind does not exist or is reduced purely to the brain. So too the soul and other non-material entities. They are rejected, and mankind is seen to be nothing more than the material or the physical. Thus even the existence of things like consciousness, intentionality, and free will are questioned. God of course is also given the boot.
Two newer books that also should not be overlooked are these:
Menuge, Angus, Brian Krouse and Robert Marks, eds., Minding the Brain: Models of the Mind, Information, and Empirical Science. Discovery Institute, 2023.
Rickabaugh, Brandon and J. P. Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism. Wiley-Blackwell, 2024.
But here I want to look at an even newer volume that I have already discussed: The Immortal Mind: A Neurosurgeon’s Case for the Existence of the Soul by Michael Egnor and Denyse O’Leary (Worthy Books, 2025). See my introductory piece on it here: https://billmuehlenberg.com/2026/05/17/atheism-god-miracles-and-neuroscience/
Unlike some of the heavy-duty philosophical terrain one must navigate in the two books just mentioned above, this volume is a bit easier to read, although still full of scientific and philosophical substance. Egnor has done over 7000 brain surgeries and has been a neuroscientist and neurosurgeon for some 40 years.
His work has led him to turn away from his former atheism and embrace the Christian worldview. He rejects physicalism and now embraces the commonsense, long-standing, and Christian view that human beings are both body and soul. Thus they have both brains and minds.
His work in brain surgery, along with many key studies, demonstrates this quite clearly. Here is a part of the science that Egnor discusses. Consider Chapter 2: “How Much Brain Does the Mind Need?” He explains how different parts of the brain deal with distinct mental activities, such as memory, perception, motions, and so on. Some parts of the brain can actually be removed safely.
But removal or injury of some other parts of the brain do cause real disabilities. Therefore, “much of the art and science of neurosurgery is learning to distinguish between vital areas (‘eloquent brain’) and nonvital areas (‘non-eloquent brain’).” (p. 39) He goes on to explain:
In short, part of the mind (initiation of movement or the capacity to form new memories, for example) maps onto specific parts of the brain. But part of the mind (understanding ideas) doesn’t. Of course, if a brain is seriously damaged, intellect and will can be impaired. But that is because the brain damage impairs memory or perception areas that are needed for the mind to understand what has happened or is happening. In any event, there are many documented cases of people continuing to think normally despite losing or missing large parts of their brains. (pp. 43-44)
The Immortal Mind: A Neurosurgeon’s Case for the Existence of the Soulby Egnor, Michael (Author), O'Leary, Denyse (Author)
He looks at brain imaging and says this:
Few neuroscientists would have predicted what we discovered when we began imaging brains routinely for medical diagnosis: that some people function normally throughout life despite the fact that there is nothing but water (cerebrospinal fluid) where large parts of the brain should be. (p. 48)
In this light he says this in part about consciousness:
Consciousness in hydranencephalic children raises some interesting questions about human consciousness in general. Even though it is central to our human experience, it’s a nebulous concept, devilishly difficult to define. For example, we are conscious in our dreams, yet “unconscious” when we are asleep.
Most of the current theories popular among neuroscientists propose that consciousness is the by-product of the processing of neurons in the cerebral cortex. Yet that’s the part of the brain that is completely missing in quite conscious children with hydranencephaly. So here’s the dilemma: Although the cerebral cortex is considered by researchers to be the “thinking” part of the brain, some basic thinking occurs with no cortex at all. (p. 54)
He closes the chapter this way:
So far, neuroscience has shown us that the human mind is a unity. It can adapt not only to a surgically split brain, but also to a variety of brain absences, even radical ones. But now let’s range a little further. Can the human mind function when the whole brain is deeply comatose? What about when the brain is afflicted with senile dementia or dying? Let’s look at the remarkable and unexpected things neuroscience can tell us about that. (p. 56)
Egnor examines a number of these areas here in some detail. Consider just one small part of his discussion:
The concept of persistent vegetative state – that a human being with severe brain damage could be a “shell” without an internal mental state – was formulated in the 1970s. It was officially recognized as a diagnosis in the 1990s. Since then, however, several remarkable research studies have challenged the certainty that patients in PVS lack internal mental states. (p. 61)
He goes on to look at these studies and the ramifications of them. Of course one such consideration involves the matter of euthanasia. Several chapters look at the new scientific studies and research and how they bear on so many matters.
Later chapters look more at the philosophical implications of such research. Consider the issue of free will. He looks both at recent scientific research, as well as the long-standing rational case for free will. He closes a chapter on this with these words:
As a neurosurgeon, I must point out that even a patient’s consent to undergo surgery depends on the reality of free will. Consider that if free will were not real, and if our actions were wholly determined by brain impulses and chemicals, how could we consider a patient’s consent to undergo surgery to be valid? After all, if free will is not real, the patient didn’t really “choose” to have surgery, any more than the patient chooses to jerk his leg when the doctor tests his reflexes by tapping his knee with a reflex hammer. Countless social interactions and even the reality of human dignity depend on the presumption that we are genuinely free to make choices.
We have the free capacity – the spiritual capacity – to choose good or evil. Multiple lines of evidence point to the fact that, ultimately, we are not mere meat machines. We are free to make choices in our lives. (p. 150)
In a chapter looking at some models of the mind, Egnor explores the options and then writes:
Neuroscience does not really support a materialist model of the mind. As we saw when discussing immortality, an older dualist model works better. Some powers of our mind are tightly linked to brain matter and are mortal, and some powers are spiritual and immortal. For example, our senses and our ability to move our bodies is mortal; our intellect and free will are immortal.
Damaging the optic nerve, for example, has immediate, profound effects on vision. But while cutting their brain in half affects perception in subtle ways, as we have seen, it has no effect on the powers of reason or will, or on the unified sense of self. In fact, the exercise of our intellect and will has a real independence from the brain. This is the model that neuroscience has actually shown us, even if it is not popular among neuroscientists. (p. 153)
My very brief overview of this book does not do it full justice, and I highly recommend that you get it and read it for yourself. Sure, most might think it quite odd that we actually have to defend things like the mind, consciousness, the soul, and the spiritual. But we live in odd times, so such defences are now very much needed.
